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In a set of two studies1, I determine: (1) which examiners are sending patents to litigation and, of those, (2)
which examiners are sending invalidated patents to litigation. Together, these studies determine what conditions
might predict the likelihood of an examiner’s patents
getting litigated or invalidated. Somewhat surprisingly,
just because an examiner issues a higher percentage of
patents does not mean he will have a similarly higher percentage of invalidated patents.
Patent litigation can act as a mechanism to “correct”
erroneously granted patents. Patent trials are expensive
and can cost about $700,000 for cases with less than $1
million at risk and as much as $4 million for cases with
$25 million or more at risk.2 Furthermore, patent trials
can take a long time, with approximately 2.5 years for
a patent case to even get to trial. Accordingly, litigation can be a costly and time-consuming process used to
correct erroneously granted patents. A better and more
cost-effective way to prevent costly litigation is to prevent
erroneously granted patents from ever entering the marketplace in the first place.
Examiners who are just out of the primary signatory
authority program, and thus are no longer under strict
review, are the examiners who disproportionately issue
litigated patents and litigated patents that are later
found invalid. Interestingly, my studies found that the
highest volume primary examiners (examiners who,
on average, grant more than one hundred patents per
year and have more than ten years of experience) issue
very few litigated patents that are later found invalid.
Examiners issuing the most patents are actually permitting “better” patents—ones that are unlikely to
be litigated or invalidated. These data suggest that
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the PTO should “reset” the docket for those primary examiners who recently gained full signatory
authority to prevent allowance of later invalidated
patents.

I. Background
Like Saint Peter standing at the Pearly Gates, the
USPTO’s mission is to allow “good” patents to issue
while preventing “bad” patents3 from getting to the marketplace. However, unlike Saint Peter, examiners do not
work miracles and can make mistakes based on the information that they are given and the time constraints they
work under. Accordingly, it is important to understand
the characteristics of those who issue good patents and
those who disproportionally issue bad patents. Once we
know which examiners are issuing invalidated patents, we
can determine if there are common characteristics associated with these examiners so that we might target their
dockets for further review to prevent more bad patents
from issuing.

II. Datasets
In two previous studies, I created three new patent databases. The first database included approximately 1.7 million patents (every patent issued from 2001 to 2012) and
their corresponding examiners.4 The second database
included approximately 12,000 patents that were litigated
between 2010 and 2011.5 The third database segmented
the 12,000 litigated patents to just those patents that were
found invalid.6 These datasets were then combined and
assembled to include information about: (1) the litigation, (2) the patent, and (3) the examiner(s) associated
with the litigated patent. The following data were collected from litigation records:
1.

Case name, citation, and termination date;

2.

Whether the patent was held valid or invalid;

3.

Whether the patent was infringed or non-infringed;
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4.

Whether the court decided litigated validity issues
based on:
a.

Enablement;

b.

Written description;

c.

Best mode;

4.

File date;

5.

Issue date;

6.

Number of years as a patent examiner as of date
when invalidated patent was issued (covers 2001 to
2011 only, so if an examiner joined the USPTO in
2002 and issued a patent in 2006 that was invalidated
in 2010, I coded the examiner as having four years of
experience);

7.

Number of patents issued during the year that invalidated patent was issued;

8.

Total number of years as a patent examiner during
the 2001 to 2011 period;

9.

Average number of patents issued per year (sum
total of all patents issued between 2001 and 2012,
divided by the number of years examiner was at the
office between 2001 and 2011).9

d. Claim indefiniteness;
e.

Patentable subject matter;

f.

Utility;

g.

Section 102 prior art7;

h. Section 102 non-prior art8;
i.

Obviousness;

j.

Double-patenting;

k. Incorrect inventorship; or
l.

Inequitable conduct or latches;

5.

If a prior art reference was cited in a 35 U.S.C. § 102
or § 103 rejection, what type of reference was cited
(US patent, US published patent application, foreign
patent, foreign published patent application, nonpatent literature, or foreign non-patent literature);

6.

If a prior art reference was cited in a 35 U.S.C. § 102
or § 103 rejection, whether the prior art reference was
cited in the prosecution history; and

7.

If the prior art reference was cited in the prosecution
history, whether the prior art was interpreted differently by the court.

As an initial matter, it is important to note that the
examiner data covers only the years from 2001 to 2012.
Accordingly, if an examiner had years of experience prior
to 2001, it is not captured by this dataset. If an examiner
had more than eleven years of experience, the data could
only capture the examiner’s work history between 2001
and 2011. Information regarding the examiners includes:
1.

Patent numbers, technology center, and art unit;

2.

Primary examiner name;

3.

Secondary examiner name (if applicable);
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Finally, in a previous study, I created a database of
every patent issued between 2001 and 2011.10 Although I
coded for both the primary and the secondary examiner
(if applicable), the examiner linked with the litigation is
the “working” examiner.11 The working examiner is the
examiner who did the most direct work on that application.12 Thus, the working examiner would be the secondary examiner (if present) or the primary examiner if there
was no secondary examiner.

III. Results
The results are broken down into two sections: (1) all
litigated patents and (2) invalidated patents.

A. All Litigated Patents13
In Figure 1 and Figure 2 below, the dotted line represents the “expected litigation” based on the proportion of
patents issued by the examiner. The solid line represents
the “actual litigation” rates seen. Thus, when the solid
line is above the dotted line, the examiners in that group
issue more litigated patents than expected. Conversely,
when the dotted line is above the solid line, the examiners
in that group issue less litigated patents than expected.14
Figure 1 shows that primary examiners can be divided
into three distinct populations. The first population,
Group 1, includes those examiners who issue patents at
a rate below 35 patents per year. This first population of
examiners are issuing litigated patents at an only slightly
higher-than-expected rate. The second population,
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Figure 1

Group 2, includes examiners who issue patents at a rate
of between 40 and 65 patents per year. This second population of examiners are issuing litigated patents at a much
higher-than-expected rate. The third and final population,
Group 3, includes examiner who issue more than 80 patents per year. Group 3 examiners issue patents at a much
lower-than-expected rate.
As shown in Figure 2, primary examiners with 3–6
years of experience were issuing a disproportionate number of litigated patents. Surprisingly, it is not the primary
examiners with the least experience (less than 2 years)
who were issuing the highest number of litigated patents.
One explanation could be that when an examiner first
becomes a primary examiner, the examiner is still under
review and could actually be under higher scrutiny since
they are in a program which determines if the examiner
should be granted full signatory authority. Thus, primary
examiners with only one or two years of experience may
be even more careful to only allow “good” cases since
they are under additional review for promotion as part
of the full signatory authority program.
Certain structural factors, combined with the Preist–
Klein type selection may explain the phenomena that
primary examiners with 3–5 years of experience have a
higher than expected rate of litigated patents. During the
first four or five years, when the junior examiner does not
yet have full signatory authority, the junior examiner is
under heavier scrutiny and her actions are reviewed by
a primary examiner as well as Quality Control. During
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these years, the junior examiner removes easy cases from
their docket by allowing the clearly allowable cases or by
rejecting the clearly unpatentable cases, which builds up
a docket of “on the fence” applications.
Once the junior examiner is promoted to a primary
examiner, she is given partial signatory authority while
she undergoes a rigorous training process that usually
takes between 1 and 2 years. After the training period,
she obtains full permanent signatory authority and her
work is no longer heavily scrutinized. Production expectations also increase when a primary examiner acquires
full signatory authority. The promotion comes with
higher pay, higher authority, and a higher productivity
rate. Although she is still subject to Quality Assurance
reviews, fellow examiners will no longer assess her every
issuance and rejection. Thus, these examiners are experiencing a higher workload and a larger docket of “on
the fence” applications but with much less support than
previously.
Applications that are “on the fence” are already likely
to be more litigated than most patents. This is because
strong patents could be allowed quickly by the examiner,
and competitors probably avoid litigation by licensing
these patents. Correspondingly, weak patents might take
longer to issue, but would most likely not be litigated
because of their weak standing, and competitors may
license these patents at a significant discount. However,
valuable patents where validity is unclear may require
litigation. These more uncertain patents may be issued
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at a higher rate when the primary examiner first receives
full signatory authority (without supervision), thereby
explaining the higher litigation rates in years 3–6.
There are many limitations to this study. First, the database is a broad database but suffers from some selection
bias due to the examiner-matching step. Specifically, temporal selection bias occurs in the database since the examiner database contains only those patents that were issued
between 2001 and 2012. Accordingly, the few litigations
with “older patents” (i.e., those patents issued before
2001) are not included in our database. Additionally,
since we only have data starting from 2001, there may
be a “left justification” issue. Because we start at 2001,
examiners who have worked prior to 2001 (inclusive) will
be coded as working less years than they actually have
worked. For example, if an examiner started working
in 1998 and quit in 2003, our database would code the
examiner as working for 3 years, while in actuality the
examiner was at the office for 6 years. Accordingly, these
results may be slightly positively skewed.
Another limitation is based on the fact that there are
many reasons to bring litigation, but many of these reasons may not represent errors by the patent examiner. For
example, a patent could be litigated and found invalid
because of inequitable conduct. In this situation, the patent examiner may have issued a valid patent based on
the fraudulent information given to her by the applicant.
Another example deals with a patent that was found
valid, but non-infringed. Here, the litigated patent may
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Actual

have been correctly issued, but litigated due to incorrect
interpretation of the scope of the claims. Accordingly,
simply because a patent is litigated, does not mean that
there were errors made at the patent office. I address this
issue in my second paper described below.

B. Invalidated Patents15
To address the aforementioned limitations, I created a
third database that included only those patents that have
been litigated to final judgment and found invalid. I then
connected these invalidated patents to their corresponding examiners to determine if there are any common characteristics among the examiners who issue invalidated
patents. I note, however, that the pool of litigations that
are litigated to final judgment reduces the sample size.
Figure 3 shows that approximately one-third of patents litigated to final judgment are found invalid. Most
invalidated patents are found in technology centers 1600,
2600, and 2700,16 which correspond to biotechnology and
organic chemistry, communications, and computer science, respectively. Most patents are invalidated on prior
art-type novelty and obviousness grounds. This study
also determined that: (1) litigated patents mainly come
from primary examiners, and (2) primary examiners who
grant between thirty and sixty patents per year are issuing a higher number of invalidated patents. Like the “all
litigated” patents dataset, the highest volume primary
examiners (those who, on average, grant more than one

IP Litigator

JULY/AUGUST 2021

Figure 3

Figure 4

hundred patents per year) issue very few litigated patents
that are later found invalid.
Figure 4 shows that most of the patents that were
invalidated in this data set were done so via the prior art
language of 35 U.S.C. §§102–03. Approximately 77 percent of the prior art references used to invalidate patents
were not found by the US Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) during examination. Additionally, 38 percent
of the prior art references used to invalidate patents were
US patents or US patent applications. Of those invalidating references that were US patents or patent applications, approximately 89 percent were not found by the
examiner. These data imply that examiners may have
failed to fully discover all prior art at the time of issuance
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and that improving PTO searching could improve patent
quality.17
This study then focused on the prior art because § 102
and § 103 prior art rejections comprised the major method
of invalidation in our data set. Specifically, I wanted to
determine if the prior art references were being misinterpreted or if the prior art references were not being found
by the USPTO. To determine this, I reviewed each of the
references used in litigation to invalidate the patent. I then
reviewed the prosecution history of each of these patents
to see if the examiner found that same reference during
prosecution. I looked at all prior art references, which
may be foreign patents, US patents, or patent applications, and non-patent literature, in both non-final and
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Figure 5

IV. Conclusions

final rejections. Additionally, the Information Disclosure
Statements were searched to determine if the applicant
initially cited the reference. Finally, this study reviewed
the face of the patent in the “References Cited” section
to determine if the prior art patent was either cited by the
examiner or cited by the applicant.
Of the patents that were invalidated using § 102 or § 103
prior art references, only 22.8 percent of those patents
cited to the invalidating prior art reference during prosecution (Figure 5). Accordingly, most of the prior art
that litigators use in court is not the same prior art that is
being used during prosecution.18 These data suggest that
a major problem with patent quality is examiner searching and finding of appropriate prior art. These data suggest that once the prior art is found, examiners generally
can interpret the prior art reference correctly.

In many ways, patent quality is tied to not only good
patent and claim drafting by the applicant but also to
good USPTO examination. These studies attempt to
characterize the common traits associated with examiners who issue litigated and invalidated patents. These
two studies show that primary examiners with full signatory authority allow the most patents that are litigated
and also later found invalid. Primary examiners with 3–5
years of experience issue a disproportionate amount of
litigated and invalidated patents.
These studies also suggests that patent searching may
play a greater role in improving patent quality. In particular, this study found that patents are invalided mainly
based on prior art references that were not found by
either the applicant or the patent examiner. Specifically,
77% of the prior art references used to invalidate patents
were not found by the USPTO. In cases where the invalidating prior art was a US patent or US patent application, the invalidating references were not found by the
patent examiner 89 percent of the time. Given the ease of
examiner access to US patent and US patent application
references, this is surprising.
One possible solution to this issue is to divide patent
examiners into two separate tracks. One track would
focus on searching and finding the most appropriate and
relevant prior art references (searching examiners). A second track would focus on generating appropriate office
actions based on the prior art received from the searching examiners (office-action generation examiners). This
division of labor would have the advantage of specialization, which might increase the quality of both the prior
art reviewed during prosecution as well as substantively
improving the quality of the office actions. Accordingly,
if the USPTO could mimic more experienced high-volume examiners by specialization and division of labor,
we might decrease the number of litigated patents that
are later held invalid.
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